Israel v Hezbollah: the failure of UNSCR 1701

The recent development of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah represents a step-up of a situation that has been through a slippery political and military slope that took a progressively deteriorating turn since last Spring. The exacerbation of the conflict over the years shows the failure of the UNSCR 1701, which was adopted in 2006 as part of the process that led to the end of the conflict of that same year and attempted to lay down the basis for a longer-term solution to the conflict. Since the approval, its implementation has shown the deficiencies that have characterised other UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions over the decades: the ability, or willingness, to engage in operations that may involve armed fighting. On these grounds, the UNIFIL mission became mostly a patrolling mission rather than a peacekeeping operation. The growth of Hezbollah’s military capabilities since 2006 and its encroachment over Southern Lebanon are a demonstration of the failure of the mission.

The present stage of the four-decade-long conflict between the two actors started on October 8, 2023 (the day after Hamas committed its massacres in the Israeli communities neighboring the Gaza Strip), when the Lebanese Shi’ite terrorist group attacked Israel in an unprovoked fashion. Since then, it launched more than 8000 rockets against Israel, killing more than 50 people and leading to the evacuation and displacement of tens of thousands of Israeli citizens. These aspects went almost underreported, if not unreported, by news outlets, leaving many to wonder why Israel has been operating so harshly and vastly over the past few weeks.

Two principles of the Israeli military doctrine must be considered to understand the step-up of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) operations. The first is the principle of the Ein Brirah, “there is no other option”. According to this principle, a military operation is implemented only as a last resort, when all other options are explored and exhausted. For almost a year, Israel has worked on two parallel tracks: military pressure on Hezbollah along with the search for a diplomatic solution. As the latter has reached a dead end, the only tool Israel currently has to re-establish peace and security in its Northern regions and return its citizens to their homes is to act energetically against Hezbollah.

The second principle followed by Israel is that its security is not outsourced. As such, Israel provides for its security by itself, without relying on other states or international organisations. This is due to the raison d’être of the existence of the State of Israel (to provide a safe place for the Jewish people, capable of protecting itself by itself) and to the distrust the Jewish State has towards UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions. UNIFIL is not the first mission involving Israel and one of its neighboring countries that failed to deliver the desired and expected results. Before UNIFIL, UNEF proved to be unable to fulfil its mission. As such, Israel feels it cannot rely on someone else to do the job to secure its borders.

In this stage, Iran seems to keep a low-profile position. This is due mainly to a strategic calculation it did: its current priority is to restart the negotiations for a new nuclear deal. Becoming openly involved in the current stage of the conflict could harm its attempt to reach a deal convenient for its long-term strategy.

The overall situation is particularly intricate. If Israel decides to launch a ground operation, it will face harsh and bloody opposition. By experience, Israel feels also that pounding hard on its enemies is the only way to persuade them to reach an agreement. It knows also that there are no good options, but only bad ones. On these terms, the issue becomes to choose the less bad option to achieve its goals. It is on these terms that Israel’s skepticism about the US-France proposal of a ceasefire has to be understood.