Thucydides Trap

Introduction

In the realm of International Relations, the concept of the Thucydides Trap has garnered significant attention, particularly in discussions on power shifts and the likelihood of conflict between rising and established powers. Coined by Harvard professor Graham Allison, the theory claims that when a rising power threatens to displace a dominant state, war becomes highly probable. While Allison draws upon Thucydides’ historical account of the Peloponnesian War, this modern interpretation deviates significantly from the original text, oversimplifying the complexities of power transitions and their outcomes. This article critically examines the Thucydides Trap, questioning its historical accuracy, its deterministic assumptions, and its applicability to contemporary global affairs.

Thucydides’ Original Account vs. Allison’s Interpretation

Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian, chronicled the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) between Athens and Sparta, attributing its causes to a variety of political, economic, and strategic factors. One of his most cited observations states:

“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

Allison seizes upon this line as the foundation of his Thucydides Trap, arguing that history repeatedly demonstrates how an emerging power’s rise leads to war with an incumbent hegemon. However, this interpretation is selective and lacks the nuance of Thucydides’ broader analysis. The historian does not argue that power transitions inevitably result in war; rather, he presents a complex interplay of structural, psychological, and diplomatic factors that contribute to conflict.

Moreover, Thucydides does not suggest a rigid, causal mechanism akin to Allison’s model. The Peloponnesian War was not simply the result of Athens’ rise; it was influenced by internal political strife, shifting alliances, and strategic miscalculations—elements largely overlooked in Allison’s reductionist framing.

Critiquing the Determinism of the Thucydides Trap

1. Historical Cases: Selection Bias and Overgeneralization

Allison’s study identifies 16 historical cases where a rising power allegedly challenged a dominant one, leading to war in 12 of them. While this statistical framing seems compelling, it suffers from selection bias:

• Misrepresentation of Historical Contexts: Wars often stem from multiple, complex causes beyond mere power shifts. For instance, the outbreak of World War I involved not just the rise of Germany but also nationalist fervor, alliance entanglements, and diplomatic failures.
• Excluding Peaceful Transitions: Cases where a rising power overtook an established one without war—such as the transition of global leadership from Britain to the United States—are underexplored, undermining the theory’s predictive value.
• Lack of Agency in Diplomacy: By focusing primarily on power structures, the Thucydides Trap neglects the agency of state leaders in preventing or provoking conflicts. It presupposes that states are bound to engage in confrontation, ignoring diplomacy, deterrence, and institutional mechanisms that have historically managed power transitions.

2. The US-China Relationship: A False Parallel

Allison frequently applies the Thucydides Trap to the contemporary rivalry between the United States and China, warning that a power shift between them could escalate into conflict. However, this comparison is flawed for several reasons:

• Economic Interdependence: Unlike Athens and Sparta, the US and China are deeply economically interwoven. The two nations rely on trade, supply chains, and global financial systems that make outright war costly and mutually destructive.
• Nuclear Deterrence: In Thucydides’ time, war was often seen as a viable means of resolving disputes. In the modern era, nuclear weapons and advanced deterrence strategies significantly reduce the likelihood of large-scale conflicts between major powers.
• Institutional Constraints: Unlike the decentralized Greek city-state system, the modern world has international institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and G20, which provide diplomatic mechanisms for conflict resolution.
• Political Differences: Sparta was a militaristic oligarchy, while Athens was an ambitious democracy. While ideological differences exist between the US and China, their competition is more strategic than existential, reducing the binary framing of a rising vs. ruling power clash.

The Dangers of Misapplying the Thucydides Trap

1. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

One of the most dangerous aspects of the Thucydides Trap is that it risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. If policymakers believe that war between a rising and dominant power is inevitable, they may take aggressive actions that accelerate conflict rather than mitigate it. Fear-based decision-making—such as military buildups, containment policies, or zero-sum diplomacy—can turn manageable tensions into crises.

2. The Undermining of Peaceful Power Transitions

History demonstrates that power shifts do not always lead to war. The peaceful transition from British to American hegemony in the early 20th century contradicts Allison’s deterministic model. Similarly, the post-Cold War order saw the European Union emerge as a powerful economic entity without military confrontation. By fixating on conflict, the Thucydides Trap narrative disregards opportunities for cooperative power-sharing, multilateralism, and diplomatic engagement.

3. Reductionist Thinking in Policy Formulation

Framing US-China relations through the Thucydides Trap distorts diplomatic priorities. Rather than fostering engagement and conflict prevention, it encourages containment strategies, escalation rhetoric, and hardline policies that worsen bilateral relations. Viewing China solely as an inevitable adversary ignores the nuanced reality of their economic, technological, and geopolitical interactions.

Conclusion

The Thucydides Trap offers an intriguing historical analogy, but its deterministic application to contemporary geopolitics is flawed. Thucydides himself did not present an ironclad law of inevitable war; rather, he provided a detailed account of the unique circumstances that led to the Peloponnesian War. By reducing power transitions to a rigid framework, Allison’s theory risks misleading policymakers, reinforcing adversarial mindsets, and fostering unnecessary hostilities.

Rather than accepting war as inevitable, international actors should focus on diplomatic strategies, economic cooperation, and conflict resolution mechanisms to manage power shifts peacefully. The true lesson from Thucydides is not that power transitions must end in war, but that human choices, miscalculations, and strategic decisions ultimately determine the course of history.

References

Allison, G. T. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Chan, S. (2008). China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory. Routledge.

Lebow, R. N. (2001). The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders. Cambridge University Press.

Thucydides, & Warner, R. (1972). The Peloponnesian War. Penguin Books.

Walt, S. M. (2018). The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Zakaria, F. (1998). From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton University Press.