

Kenning the novelty of New Wars

Abstract

War has long been part of human history, and its atrocities have made it part of academic practice to avoid it in the best possible manner. To understand the intensity of an issue, one must investigate it. The decades-long debate over the changing characteristics of war has blurred the actual concept of war. Advancements in technology and globalization have changed the conduct of war to a new form. This paper synthesizes the conception of war and tries to differentiate it from the new war. It presents arguments from both sides: the new war and orthodox war scholars. It later presents the old war scholar's defense that war has not changed its nature. It also presents Clausewitz's War Studies as a litmus test for the "new wars" scholar's claim. It emphasizes the outcomes, goals, and actors of warring parties as a foundation for new war scholars.

Introduction

Today's globalized world has blurred the definition of war with the constant use of the adjectives "old" and "new." Today's world focuses more on the adjectives' meaning and dynamics than on the definition of the word "war" itself. To understand these two adjectives, one must separate them and explore the essence of "war." The classic definition of Clausewitz regarding war is "throughout history, a normal way of conducting disputes between political groups" (Strachan, 2007). On the other hand, the definition revolves around the modern writer reflecting the use of violence in his work. The term "new war" (Kaldor, 2012) got currency in the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, when the mode of warfare got changed by the idea of globalization and the advancement of technology. The "New War" is the product of globalization, which emerged during the second world war and the cold war (Kalyvas, 2001; Berdal, 2003; Mundy, 2011). To answer the question that there is no "New Wars", only "Old

Wars" fought with the latest technology. This paper will try to show both sides of the argument for new and old wars, and it will also try to explain the old wars approach with the latest technology. Chapter one introduces the topic and provides the context of old and new wars. It also presents the literature of existing scholars. Chapter two defines the term war and presents its characteristics. It mainly focuses on Clausewitz's study of war. Chapter three provides the complete vocabulary of new wars. It presents its characteristics and grounds as a sub-topic of the chapter. Chapter four brings back to the study of Clausewitz and re-interprets war. It tries to eradicate the confusion regarding war conception. In its sub-heading, the chapter traces the characteristics of new wars in old wars. Chapter five touches upon the idea of cyber war as a new war.

This paper investigates the war in the context of "new wars," a novel term and ideology presented by scholars. Initially, it tries to define war and provides a broader context of war which is standard on both sides. Later it tries to present the new war scholar's argument, which differentiates it from conventional wars. It brings forth the characteristic-based distinction in terms of ideology and means. The topic has been of great importance since the U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan. It also touches upon the declaration of the end goals of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Technically it dismantles the whole conception of the non-state actors and their goal to remain in war as a business. On the Hine side, it also presents the policy framework to fight such intra-state wars or increased civil conflicts. This study will help the researcher further investigate the area of new wars in the modern age and the age of cyber warfare.

Literary Review

New and old war has long been a topic thesis and counter-thesis for scholars. The new war school of thought (Kaldor, 1999-2012; Held et al., 1999; Morgan, 2007; Snow, 1996) states that war has changed its nature and characteristic. For them, the goals and the end mean deciding the nature of war. For Münkler, the vocabulary of the new war blurs the idea of goal classification and merges power lust, ethnocultural conflicts, and ideological deviances. Having no definite goals and purpose makes it difficult to end the conflict between the warring parties

(Münkler, 2005). For Kaldor, a new war fought by the warlord and non-state actors has no definite goals. States do not fight each other in new wars (Kaldor, 2012). For Strachan, the state is the leading actor behind the conduct of non-state actors and warlords. They possess debatable end goals (Strachan, 2012). For Henderson & Singer, new war scholars such as (Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 1999) club the comprehensive classification of war under the umbrella of "Old War" and presents a new scientific domain as "New War" (Henderson & Singer, 2002). For Strachan, Clausewitz's war studies have been misinterpreted and presented without context to shape the new war narrative (Clausewitz et al., 1989; Strachan, 2012). Clausewitz's trinity presents the changing characteristic of war (Schuurman, 2010).

Understanding War

Clausewitz states that "war is nothing but a big duel". In another account, he states, "war is nothing but an act of violence meant to force our opponent to do what we want" (von Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 75). "Just Wars" provides moral permission for the act of violence instead of the conditional requirements. Condition-based war comes under the umbrella of the Juridical definition of war. Clausewitz provides the political definition of war as an act of violence, whereas Singer and Small provide the sociological definition of war (Wolfendale, 2017). Violence is the only condition that defines war. "Not only is war impossible without violence, but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war" (Small et al., 1982). On the contrary to this, yes, war is an act of violence, but it can get controlled or limited. One Prominent example of such wars could be seen in the wars fought under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W). Only one thousand casualties occurred within all warring parties (GÖKALP, 2021). It underpins the critical role of goals of war and end means. It also presents the law of war that were implemented by Him in that era and laid the foundation of the war laws, conventions, and norms. It helped to stick with the goals and avoid using inhumane activities in the war. The most common types of wars are interstate wars, civil wars, and extra-state wars. The classification is based on the typology, which rests on the type of participants, goals, and affiliation (Small et al., 1982).

Civil war and the low-level conflicts driven by religious or sectarian goals present the "new civil war" or the "new war." This type of conflict is nothing new, but it has been present in the past on a large scale and with greater magnitude. The work of Jomini from the 1960s also depicts a similar expression. Baron De Jomini is also known as the father of tactics and logistics in the art of war. He was the first to introduce logistics as a standard term in warfare, which is still applicable in modern-day warfare. In his book "The Art of War", he states that war is not a science but an art based on the six major principles: strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, minor tactics, and statesmanship relations with war (de Jomini & Schulze, 1862, pp. 19-20). The essential principles of strategy are: determining the theatre of war, determining the decisive points; determining the base zone and the operational zone; determining the mode of war; determining the line of action; determining the objectives; defining the strategic line; evaluating bases of operation and diversions (de Jomini & Schulze, 1862, p. 152).

The primary work of Jomini, unlike Clausewitz, is based on the conduct of the war. Despite defining the war, he elaborates on different reasons which lead a state to pursue war. States fight wars to defend or claim rights, pursue the state's greater interests, protect close neighbors for their protection, aid as an alliance, annex, expand, and display muscles, defend sovereignty, and seek respect or honor. This reason heavily influences, on the one hand, the nature and, on the other hand, the conduct of major interstate wars; alliance wars against a single enemy; alliance wars with other states to assist in an ongoing war; national war; proxy war; or religious or civil war (de Jomini & Schulze, 1862, pp.22–25). Grand tactics are all about appointing the troops and arranging them effectively according to the requirements of the situation (de Jomini & Schulze, 1862, p. 155). His studies showed that most of the wars that people have been calling "new civil wars" or "new wars" since the end of the 20th century.

New Wars

"New war" is the state's socioeconomic condition based on the combination of private investors, non-state actors, and globalization (Held et al., 1999; Deacon, 2012). The state becomes a failed state (Kaldor, 2012) when it cannot protect its citizens due to a weak socioeconomic situation (Morgan, 2007). The phenomena which strengthened the need to revisit the nature and characteristics of war were the post-Second World War relationship with the

declining rate of interstate war (wars between the states) and the increased rate of intra-state wars of civil conflicts (wars within the states). Mary Kaldor, in her book "New and Old Wars" (3rd edition), characteristics and differentiates "new wars" from the "old wars" by presenting the argument of Clausewitz that "war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" (von Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 75). "New wars" are a phenomenon that is more concerned with the war itself and the business of war (enterprise) than with a quest for will on both ends. The goal is grabbing the utilities rather than winning or losing in a war (Kaldor, 2012, p. 218). At the same time, the old war has a clear outcome in terms of results.

"New wars" are classified on three major criteria: goals, tactics, and financial resources to carry out the mission. The first characteristic refers to the creation of new identities. The new type of war aims to pursue identity politics rather than focusing on regional, geopolitical, or ideological ends. The new types of identities get formed to carry on the business of the war. These identities are more grass-root level identities, including national, religious (sectarian-Shia-Sunni) and tribal identities against the old ideological identities like socialist, communist, and capitalist identities (Kaldor, 2012, p. 7,8). "War tactics" referred to as the second major characteristic differentiating the "new wars" from the "old war". The pre-requisite for it is guerilla warfare and "counter-insurgency". She elaborates that it gets used to control the public's thought process and to control minds without getting involved physically. (Kaldor, 2012, p. 9). The idea of making identities works as a spark to spread fear and hatred in public, which is needed to keep the business of war going.

Characteristics of New War

New war scholars state that "New Wars" differs from the "Old Wars". First, the conflict shifted from European regions to post-colonial regions. Second, it shifts its concentration from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts. Third, "New Wars" carries comparatively different goals and results. Finally, it requires a new policy approach to fight such wars (Kaldor, 1999-2012; Sarkees & Schafer, 2000; Small et al., 1982). Violence in new wars gets directed toward

civilians instead of the formal forces. Unlike in the old war, violence gets used against the armed forces. The third characteristic that differentiates "new wars" is the financing mechanism.

Under these conditions, organizations like this rely on third-party financing. The major sources of revenue for the war economy in the new war are "plunder, hostage-ransom, illegal weapons trade, drugs export, valuable commodities trafficking, human trafficking, and prostitution" (Kaldor, 2012, p. 10). Whereas the "old war" gets driven by taxation and state revenue. Globalization has allowed non-state violent actors to access international markets without the state's interference. With innovation and technological advancement, transactions between local and international parties have become easy. It has provided a platform with assistance to the illegal arms trade for such groups around the globe. "Greed and grievance" need attention to understand the acts of violence in the "new wars" (Berdal, 2003). The death toll is five times that of an interstate war (Mundy, 2011). Old civil wars were fought for noble causes, political agendas, and social change and had public support. Violence gets carried out to the minimal degree under which stood allowed in any rebellion or uprising. At the same time, the new civil wars get fought for private goals and criminal activities. New civil wars lack public support and use limitless violence with no direction (Kalyvas, 2001). Most of the work done by "new war" scholars tries to get rid of Clausewitz's real work, which was done under different circumstances but is still useful.

Revisiting Clausewitz

There is a misconception about the study of Clausewitz that he advocated violence in War based on two assumptions: either they have not studied Clausewitz in-depth or merely studied it as the ideal condition. In his book "On War," he discusses how the idea of War and the reality of War are two different things. There is no clear outcome of the War, as the victorious side might have lost on the political front, and the side that has defeated might have had one on the political front. Thus, Clausewitz refers to the chance of conflict based on the desired results (von Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 80), which Mary Kaldor has presented as that both sides do not fight to win the War but to achieve the goals in terms of utilities. In his book on War, Clausewitz states, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" on the one hand and elaborates on the force further. Thus, the meaning of War is force—physical force because moral force does not exist

except as expressed in the state and law—and the object of War is to impose our will on the enemy. To secure the object, we must render the enemy powerless, and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. The aim takes the object's place, discarding it as part of the War itself "(von Clausewitz et al., 1989, p. 76). "Call it what you will—new war, ethnic war, guerilla war, low-intensity war, terrorism or the war on terrorism—in the end, there is only one meaningful category of war, and that is war itself" (Angstrom & Duyvesteyn, 2004, p. 52).

The other school of thought states that the idea of the "New War" is a total misinterpretation of the wars presented by Clausewitz. For Schuurman, scholars have yet to consult Clausewitz's literature or understand it. It has become a hindrance to understanding his studies' implications for the wars of today and the past. For the "New War", scholars generalize the idea of interstate War, extra-state War, and intra-state War as the "Old War". It provides them with a novel adjective, "New", which interprets that the nature of War has changed. The area is still debatable as few key areas have changed over the past decades, but the general nature of the War is still prevalent in war studies. The critical distinction here is the policy and conduct of the War, which requires revision in modern ages (Henderson & Singer, 2002). The "paradoxical trinity" is the gist of Clausewitz's literature based on the principles of violence, change, and rational purpose. It elaborates and helps to understand the basics of "absolute" and "real" War in each segment. Misunderstanding Clausewitz makes his studies redundant in the modern type of War (Schuurman, 2010). The novelty of the "new war" is firmly based on the adjective "new," which elucidates the importance attached to the policymaking process. Kaldor wants to bring the issue of policymaking to the limelight as policymakers are still following the post-Clausewitz wartime teachings to design policies to deal with the "new wars" (Kaldor, 2012).

According to Hew Strachan, the term "strategic" has lost its meaning in terms of War, and most people and scholars confuse the meanings of policy and strategy. Most scholars misunderstood Clausewitz's "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means" and linked it with the policy. However in reality, the book "On War" elucidates the War itself, not the policy or the strategy. Tony Blair and George W. Bush expressed a policy on the "global war on terror", but contrary to this, they had a policy instead of a strategy. Strategy based on the interpretation of the War and its nature rests on it to shape the policy. In ideology, strategy is

different from policy, but in reality, it is in constant dialogue with policy, according to Clausewitz. Sami Ramadani wrote about the lack of strategy in terms of the Iraq invasion: Tony Blair and Bush "allegedly launched the war at first to save the world from Saddam's" weapons of mass destruction (WMD), then to establish democracy, then to fight al-Qaida's terrorism, and now to prevent civil War and Iranian or Syrian intervention" (Strachan, 2007). Interstate war with a slow pace but with consistency has been present throughout the post-World War 2 periods, especially in the last four decades where the United Kingdom fought against Argentina in 1982, Iraq in 1990-91, Siberia in 1999, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011.

In contrast, the risk register of national security states that the UK has the slightest chance of major interstate wars. Prominent scholars believe that interstate wars are the least likely phenomenon. However, a major interstate war is the least likely phenomenon (Strachan, 2012, 28:00). War is an art of the state used to achieve political goals that confront the idea of a "new war" Scholars who claim that in a new war, people will go to War will be proven wrong. The principal actors driving the new wars are warlords and non-state actors (Kaldor, 2012). The state itself is the primary characteristic that drives the warlord and non-state actors. It includes those fighting in love for the state (Strachan, 2012, 34:05). On the other hand, the significant contribution of the Civil War was the process of state sovereignty and the definition of their nature in the post-exit period of the colonial power from their empire. Civil wars since then have declined. Clausewitz's studies are even applicable to the domain of cyber wars. It goes side by side with the concepts of Sun Tzu from *The Art of War*.

New War in Old Times?

"To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." (Griffith, 1963). It is prevalent in the action of cyber war activities as well as the physical force's activities, where the main initial goal is to make the command-and-control center of the enemy incapable. It is a very common term in cyber warfare, where they sneak into the enemy's computer and system to hijack and control it without getting involved in a physical confrontation. It is what the Strategic Support Force SSF of the People's Republic of China was assigned to do in the name of modern warfare and cyber warfare.

The different organized groups, with or without the government's regulation, are involved in espionage activities, especially PRC against the USA. William Lind and Thomas Hobbes state that the "new war" is fourth-generation warfare (4GW), and the most challenging thing in its way is the old school of thought driving to operate the new type of war in an old-fashioned manner (Cowen, 2008). In this book *On War*, Clausewitz presented the inter-related three aspects of the trinity as a fundamental aspect of the state. The three aspects that elaborate the direction of state and what is achievable from war are the blind force composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; the play of uncertainty and chance in which the creative spirit roams; and the reason for violence, or the political instrument.

Clausewitz elucidates that war is waged based on the state's finances, resources, military capabilities, and policies and provides societal stability. If any of them gets disrupted, the situation can worsen, but the state can still survive; however, if all of these tendencies get disrupted, it becomes impossible for the state to resist (Sharma, 2010). In the era of information technology, everybody has become more social on social media, despite becoming social in the real world. Cyberspace has made the globalizing world more globalized and presented some miracles. On the one hand, it has made life easier, while on the other hand, it has made every single individual more vulnerable.

Cyber-War: A New War?

Cyberspace is not only confined to the public, but it also covers the military and governments worldwide, making them vulnerable simultaneously. Every single activity gets done via technology in daily life, which leaves a digital print and provides the pattern of activities. One can quickly transfer a considerable amount of money with one click through e-banking from the mobile app and invest or withdraw from the stock exchange. Almost all the activities are informative or information-enabled at the military level, ranging from ground operations to air strike-through unmanned vehicles and surveillance. While at the government level, most of the tasks are performed through technology, ranging from drafting legislation or running for public

office. All three of these three aspects of the state refer to the aspects of the Clausewitz trinity, where all are prone to violence through hacking, looting bank accounts virtually, and intervening in election campaigns as happened in the past (Sharma, 2010). A simple bug or error can cause a huge problem and can cause severe dents to the most efficient system on the globe. The Internet server went down in Sweden and Germany for a couple of hours; a systematic error in the Pentagon's system restricted them from connecting to satellite; a metro accident in Washington in 2010, 6 stealth rapport compute failures caused lost tracks; and many others (Goldsmith, 2013). It shows the tendency of the system to self-destruct if the whole system is hacked or crashed, on which everyday routine work is dependent.

New wars are never decided based on the modern or high-tech-military weapons used in the war. The War in Afghanistan deployed high-tech military weapons but remained the old war. It confirms through the surveillance footage of the intense conflict area of Afghanistan (Adoba, 2014). Three waves have changed the world's socioeconomic order throughout humanity's revolutionary history. According to Alvin and Toffler, these waves include the revolutionary agricultural wave first, the industrial revolutionary wave second, and the revolutionary information wave. The idea of "information warfare" is not new to the world; it has been around throughout history as the core meaning of "information warfare" is efficiently performing operations using technological means.

Cyberspace is the whole arena of different operations and wars, including cyberwar, electronic warfare, hacking, and information jamming. Information-based warfare and psychological warfare. Technology has played a vital role in the area of war with its evolution in obstruction weapons, destruction weapons, and weapons of communication (Nunes, 1999). The use of technology in the 1991 Gulf War inspired the PRC to reform the PLA to meet future battlefield requirements. Information warfare became a blue-eyed concept in the early '90s for China when the rest of the world struggled with the surge of civil war and interstate wars in the region. The takeaway points from the Gulf War for the PLA were that technology was the fundamental principle of modern war, not merely confined to tactical or operational levels. However, it was as crucial for the strategic objectives as it was for the other areas. It also became a milestone to develop the advanced technological system to conduct distant long-range attacks with precision for "quick resolution" and to use it for combined military operations (Mulvenon &

Yang, 1999, pp. 178–179). This phenomenon brought numerous changes in the PLA and a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the past.

Recently, modernization under President Xi Jinping (Maizland, 2020) enabled the PRC to develop its C4ISR for "preparedness" and the "conduct" of the war. It enabled the PRC to develop modern instruments of war to fight the "old war" and to enhance itself for future warfare (Medeiros, Cliff, Crane, Mulvenon, 2005). Moreover, PRC has successfully prepared local planes by taking designs from different parts of the world and producing them with modern technologies with the trademark of the PRC. In other words, they actively participate in espionage activities (Mulvenon & Yang, 1999, p. 227). Not solely in the past, but the PRC in the Taiwan Straits and especially against the United States is actively involved in these cyber-espionage activities (FireEye, 2019, 01:00), referring to the concept of the "Thucydides trap," where one rising power challenges the pre-established power and gets into the business of war. It raises the question, "*Is cyberwar an act of war?*".

According to Lawrence Freedman, in response to the talk of information warfare, information warfare has a minor effect on the general public and the states compared to the religious fanatics and the terrorist groups and individuals who can explode anything, any time and anywhere (Rawnsley, 2005). On the other hand, the other school of thought labels it as an act of war, as the US government has mentioned, and besides, official troops are present within the forces of the world to counter such attacks. It might range from merely getting into the system to spying or getting involved in espionage. The NSA and the US cyber command talked about how fast, what these attacks were about, how serious they were, and how big they were (PBS News, 2018, "0:40" section).

Conclusion

For some, war is an enterprise; for others, it is an economic condition; for some, it is a chapter from the past; and for some, it is an art. With the evolution of industry and the advancement of technology the desire to change the nature of war has made scholars give a second thought to small conflicts as a new type of war. The term "new war" emerged at the end of the twentieth

century and the beginning of the twenty-first. It tried to outdate the existing principles and concept of war, while the other school of thought states that the term "war" itself has greater magnitude and dynamic, which doesn't require adjectives for its definition. For them, war may not be fought without an enemy and an objective, which is contradictory to the "new war." This paper tried to elucidate the terms "new" and "old" war and the use of technology in the old war. The "new war," according to Mary Kaldor, is different in its nature, tactics, and finances. The subject of the violence is mainly the public, as compared to the "old war," where it was mainly directed toward the armed forces. It tries to create political identities. Those identities, such as "Shia-Suni" identities, are created due to war and are not based solely on political ideologies.

New wars scholars say they want to draw attention to the laws and conventions that have become ineffective in fighting new wars. Scholars draw different analogies from economics and cyberspace to make it new. On the other hand, Hew Strachan and other scholars state that this is to eradicate the studies of Clausewitz and give a new direction to war. The principles of Clausewitz are still valid and applicable even in today's modern technology, and for that one has to study Clausewitz critically. The Trinity of Clausewitz elaborates on the principle of the state and its relation to cyberspace and cyber warfare. This also creates a statement here that "New Wars" are only "Old Wars" fought with the latest technology, and to understand it, a critical understanding of Clausewitz is required.

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