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This paper explores Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities through the lens of "nuclear hedging," a strategy of maintaining the potential to develop nuclear weapons without overtly doing so. The analysis examines Iran's motivations, including a desire for regional dominance, security concerns arising from past regime changes in the Middle East, and the prestige associated with nuclear weapons.
The abstract then defines nuclear hedging and details Iran's possible reasons for adopting this approach. This includes maintaining a negotiating advantage, deterring potential military intervention, and achieving recognition as a regional power.
Furthermore, the abstract highlights Iran's use of strategic ambiguity, employing mixed messaging through government officials to both reassure the international community and retain the option for rapid nuclear development. The collapse of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and subsequent enrichment activities beyond civilian needs are presented as evidence of this strategy.
Finally, the abstract acknowledges the challenges Iran faces in sustaining nuclear hedging, including the economic burden and the lack of a clear delivery system for potential weapons. It concludes by emphasizing the potential consequences of a failed hedging strategy, including regional conflict and the possibility of Iran becoming a full-fledged nuclear power.
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